Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Carlos Di Bonifacio Author-Email: carlos.dibonifacio@carloalberto.org Author-Name: Guido Merzoni Author-Email: guido.merzoni@unicatt.it Author-Name: Federico Trombetta Author-Email: federico.trombetta@unicatt.it Title: Incumbency Effect in Competitive Autocracies: evidence from Venezuela Abstract: We document the presence of a strong incumbency disadvantage in local elections in a competitive autocracy: Venezuela. Using newly coded data on municipal election outcomes, we find that municipalities having experienced a narrow victory by the pro-regime party (PSUV) are 24 percentage points less likely to re-elect a pro-regime mayor in subsequent elections compared to those with marginal opposition victories. This disadvantage is primarily influenced by voter turnout, as participation rates increase on average by 6 percentage points in municipalities where the pro-regime party narrowly won. The incumbency disadvantage is driven precisely by those elections leading to a low future abstention rate. Overall, we stress the important role of voters mobilization even in the context of autocratic regimes. Creation-Date: 2024 File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/diseis-wp_2402.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf Number: dis2402 Classification-JEL: D71, D72, D78, D79 Handle: RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis2402