Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Carlo Beretta
Author-Email: carlo.beretta@unicatt.it
Title: Relazioni durature e mercati incompleti Parte II
Abstract: Perfect competition requires impersonal interactions. Coupled with moral hazard and asymmetric information, this precipitates on Nash equilibria that are generically Pareto inefficient. The dangers associated to impersonality when markets are incomplete are illustrated in the case of saving and its employment in the purchase of either financial or real activities 
Classification-JEL: D52, D82
Creation-Date: 2014
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/diseis-Beretta_14_02_def.pdf
File-Format: Application/PDF
Number: dis1402
Handle: RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis1402