Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Stefano Colombo
Author-X-Name-First: Stefano
Author-X-Name-Last: Colombo
Author-Email: stefano.colombo@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: DISCE, Università Cattolica
Author-Name: Luigi Filippini
Author-X-Name-First: Luigi
Author-X-Name-Last: Filippini
Author-Email: luigi.filippini@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: DISCE, Università Cattolica
Title: Patent licensing with Bertrand competitors
Abstract: We study optimal licensing contracts in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and show that per-unit contracts are preferred to ad valorem contracts by the patentee, while welfare is higher under the ad valorem contract. The difference between Cournot and Bertrand case is explained in terms of quantity effect and profits effect.
Length: 53 pages
Creation-Date: 2012-04
Publication-Status: none
File-URL: http://istituti.unicatt.it/teoria_economica_metodi_quantitativi_itemq1262.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2012
Number: itemq1262
Classification-JEL: D45
Keywords: Two-part contracts; patent licensing, ad valorem royalties; Bertrand
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie6:itemq1262