Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name:  Gianluca Femminis
Author-X-Name-First: Gianluca
Author-X-Name-Last: Femminis
Author-Email:  gianluca.femminis@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: DISCE, Università Cattolica di Milano
Author-Name:  Gianmaria Martini
Author-X-Name-First: Gianmaria
Author-X-Name-Last: Martini
Author-Email:  gianmaria.martini@unibg.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università di Bergamo
Title:  Extended RJV cooperation and social welfare
Abstract: A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation is more valuable.
Length:  nn pages
Creation-Date:  2008-12
Publication-Status: none
File-URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/TeoriaEconomica/Quaderni/itemq0852.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2008
Number: itemq0852
Classification-JEL: L13, L41, O33
Keywords: RJV, R&D, collusion
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie6:itemq0852