Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini
Author-X-Name-First: Carlo
Author-X-Name-Last: Bellavite Pellegrini
Author-Email: carlo.bellavite@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Politica Economica, DISCE,& Centro Studi Economia Applicata (CSEA), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy
Author-Name: Rachele Camacci
Author-X-Name-First: Rachele
Author-X-Name-Last: Camacci
Author-Email: rachele.camacci@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Centro Studi Economia Applicata (CSEA), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy
Author-Name: Laura Pellegrini
Author-X-Name-First: Laura
Author-X-Name-Last: Pellegrini
Author-Email: laura.pellegrini@unibg.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Scienze Aziendali, Università di Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy - Centro Studi Economia Applicata (CSEA), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy
Author-Name: Andrea Roncella
Author-X-Name-First: Andrea
Author-X-Name-Last: Roncella
Author-Email: andrea.roncella@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Centro Studi Economia Applicata (CSEA), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy
Title: Interaction between Ownership Structure and Systemic Risk in the European financial sector
Abstract: This paper aims to empirically test the interaction between systemic risk and corporate governance factors in the European banking framework on a balance panel data of 96 listed banks from 19 countries during the period 2011-2020. The purpose is to understand the role of a corporate governance’s specific issue for the systemic risk, throughtout a period that saw Europe been signed by financial turmoil’s long tail and the ‘whatever it takes’ recovery. Among the available possible governance features we focus on the ownership structure, as the literature shows that it affects the performance of the firm, both on profitability and risk. We choose the European context since its eterogeneity and the presence of a high level of institutional ownership.  To measure systemic risk, we will adopt the CoVaR approach (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). Our results show that ownership concentration decreases systemic risk over the period analized, meanwhile institutional investors’ high presence increases it.
Length: 31
Creation-Date: 2023-02
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/politica-economica-DIPE0030.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2023
Number: dipe0030
Classification-JEL: G10, G21, G32
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Ownerhsip Structure, Institutional Investors, Systemic Risk
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie5:dipe0030