Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Stefano Colombo 
Author-X-Name-First: Stefano
Author-X-Name-Last: Colombo
Author-Email: stefano.colombo@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: DISCE, Università Cattolica
Title: Pricing Policy and Partial Collusion
Abstract: We study the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a partial collusion duopolistic framework where firms 
in the first stage of the game choose non-cooperatively whether to price discriminate or not, and from the second stage onward
collude on prices.When the discount factor is particularly high or particularly low both firms price discriminate in equilibrium.
For intermediate discount factors and high firms'asymmetry, the unique equilibrium is characterized by only the smaller firm choosing
price discrimination.In the case of intermediate discount factors and low firms'asymmetry, there are two possible equilibria: 
both firms price discriminate or no firm price discriminates.
Length: 23
Creation-Date: 2009-10
File-URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza/Quaderni/ief0090.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2009
Number: ief0090
Classification-JEL: D43, L13, L40
Keywords: Partial Collusion, Pricing policy, Price discrimination
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie3:ief0090