Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Massimo Bordignon
Author-X-Name-First: Massimo
Author-X-Name-Last: Bordignon
Author-Email: massimo.bordignon@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: DISCE, Università Cattolica

Author-Name: Guido Tabellini
Author-X-Name-First: Guido
Author-X-Name-Last: Tabellini
Author-Email: 
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Bocconi

Title: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Abstract: We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality
rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous
party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger
but the influence of extremists voters on equilibrium policy is smaller,
because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot
election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy
volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy,
where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single)
ballots respectively.

Length: nn pages 63
Creation-Date: 2009-03

File-URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza/Quaderni/ief0087.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2009
Number: ief0087
Classification-JEL: H7
Keywords: political extremism

Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie3:ief0087