Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: A.K.S. Chand
Author-X-Name-First: A.K.S.
Author-X-Name-Last:Chand

Author-Name: Sergio Currarini
Author-X-Name-First: Sergio 
Author-X-Name-Last: Currarini

Author-Name: Giovanni Ursino
Author-X-Name-First: Giovanni 
Author-X-Name-Last: Ursino
Author-Email: giovanni.ursino@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore


Title: Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Abstract: We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision
maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap
talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens
the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium. We then generalize the
model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect
of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone,
and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium behavior, making it easier to
sustain truth-telling.
Length: 23
Creation-Date: 2015-05
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def024.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2015
Number: def024
Classification-JEL: C72; D82; D83. 
Keywords: Cheap Talk, Multiple Senders, Correlation
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def024