Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Silvia Platoni
Author-X-Name-First: Silvia
Author-X-Name-Last: Platoni
Author-Email: silvia.platoni@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: DISCE, Università Cattolica
Author-Name: Francesco Timpano
Author-X-Name-First: Francesco
Author-X-Name-Last: Timpano
Author-Email: francesco.timpano@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: DISCE, Università Cattolica
Title: Redistribution and Tax Evasion: an Asymmetric Information Approach
Abstract: The article studies the optimal redistribution system, achieved by direct taxation, indirect taxation and public 
provision of the pseudo-necessary good, when individuals, who differ in productivity, can take hidden actions (tax evasion by 
moral hazard) and have hidden information (tax evasion by adverse selection). It proves that any Government willing to 
effectively reallocate resources among individuals has to undertake measures against tax evasion, i.e. to establish tax 
evasion fines.
Length: 35 pages
Creation-Date: 2013-07
Publication-Status: Published in Review of Economics, Month aaaa, pages nn1-nn2
File-URL: http://www.unicatt.it/dipartimenti/DISES/allegati/dises1394.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2013
Number: dises1394
Classification-JEL: H23; H42; H26; D82
Keywords: Redistribution; Tax Evasion; Asymmetric Information.
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie2:dises1394