Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Hinnerk Gnutzmann
Author-X-Name-First: Hinnerk 
Author-X-Name-Last: Gnutzmann

Author-Email: hinnerk.gnutzmann@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Title: Price Discrimination in Asymmetric Industries: Implications for Competition and Welfare
Abstract: Price discrimination by consumer's purchase history is widely used in regulated
industries, such as communication or utilities, both by incumbents and
entrants. I show that such discrimination can have surprisingly negative welfare
eects { even though prices and industry prots fall, so does consumer
surplus. Earlier studies that did not allow entrants to discriminate or assumed
symmetric rms yielded sharply dierent results, the pro{competitive
eect of price discrimination are stronger in these settings. Imposing a pricing
constraint on incumbent's discrimination leads the entrant to discriminate
more heavily, but still improves both consumer and producer welfare.
Length: 18
Creation-Date: 2014-11
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def0019.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2014
Number: def0019
Classification-JEL: L13, L41. 
Keywords: History{based price discrimination, asymmetric price discrimination, switching cost
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def0019