Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0

Author-Name: Marco Ovidi
Author-X-Name-First: Marco
Author-X-Name-Last: Ovidi
Author-Email: marco.ovidi@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore



Title: Parents Know Better: Sorting on Match Effects in Primary School.


Abstract: I show that parents select schools by considering attributes of the student-school
match that improve the learning outcomes beyond average school quality. Using the
centralized algorithm for offers to primary school in London, I compare the achievement
of students who are as good as randomly enroled in schools ranked differently in their
application. Enroling at the most-preferred school versus an institution ranked lower
increases achievement by 0.10 SD beyond school value-added among students with
similar characteristics. Only a small part of the match effects of parental choice can be
explained by student’s characteristics such as gender, ability, or socioeconomic status.
Length: 80
Creation-Date: 2022-11
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def121.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2022
Number: def121
Classification-JEL: H75, I21, I24, I28. 
Keywords: Centralised assignment, Deferred acceptance, School choice, School effectiveness.
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def121