Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0

Author-Name: Elena Cottini
Author-X-Name-First: Elena
Author-X-Name-Last: Cottini
Author-Email: elena.cottini@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Author-Name: Paolo Ghinetti
Author-X-Name-First: Paolo
Author-X-Name-Last: Ghinetti


Author-Name: Elisabetta Iossa
Author-X-Name-First: Elisabetta
Author-X-Name-Last: Iossa
Author-Name: Pierluigi Sacco
Author-X-Name-First: Pierluigi
Author-X-Name-Last: Sacco


Title: Stress and Incentives at Work.


Abstract: An extensive medical and occupational-health literature finds that an imbalance
between effort and reward is an important stressor which produces serious health
consequences. We incorporate these effects in a simple agency model with moral
hazard and limitecl liability, and study their impact on the agent's effort and utility,
assuming that agents differ in their stress susceptibility. We test our predictions
using the 2015 wave of the European Working Condition Survey. We find that
individuals who are more susceptible to stress work harder and have lower subjective
well-being. 
Length: 25
Creation-Date: 2021-01
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def097.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2021
Number: def097
Classification-JEL: 082, 131, J33, L2. 
Keywords: Effort-Reward Imbalance, incentives, stress, subjective well-being.
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def097