Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0



Author-Name: Claudio Lucifora
Author-X-Name-First: Claudio
Author-X-Name-Last: Lucifora
Author-Email: claudio.lucifora@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Name: Daria Vigani
Author-X-Name-First: Daria
Author-X-Name-Last: Vigani


Title: Losing control? Unions' Representativeness, "Pirate" Collective Agreements and Wages.


Abstract: This paper documents the evolution of sector-level collective agreements in Italy and estimates
the wage effects of the diffusion of non-representative agreements, often signed by unknown
organisations - i.e. "pirate" agreements. Using employer-employee data from Social Security
Archives, we nd evidence of a signicant dumping effect on wages associated with different
types of non-representative agreements (-15% with respect to regular collective agreements).
We show that half of the wage differential associated with "pirate" agreements is due to selection
effects. Also, heterogeneous effects are found across rm size and industry aliation. Finally, we
show that rms with non-representative agreements are also less likely to comply with negotiate. 
Length: 27
Creation-Date: 2020-03
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def087.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2020
Number: def087
Classification-JEL: J52, J31, J41. 
Keywords: collective bargaining, collective agreements, representativeness, wage dierentials.
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def087