Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0

Author-Name: Laura Abrardi
Author-X-Name-First: Laura
Author-X-Name-Last: Abrardi


Author-Name: Luca Colombo
Author-X-Name-First: Luca
Author-X-Name-Last: Colombo
Author-Email: lucava.colombo@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore


Author-Name: Piero Tedeschi
Author-X-Name-First: Piero
Author-X-Name-Last: Tedeschi




Title: The Gains of Ignoring Risk: Insurance with Better Informed Principals.


Abstract: We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative
advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and
heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent
profitability and the pooling of risk observed in some insurance markets. Furthermore,
we find that a lower market concentration may entail an increase in insurance premia
Length: 75
Creation-Date: 2019-07
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def084.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2019
Number: def084
Classification-JEL: D43, D82, G22. 
Keywords: Insurance markets, Asymmetric information, Risk assessment, Market concentration.
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def084