Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0

Author-Name: Rosario Crinò
Author-X-Name-First: Rosario
Author-X-Name-Last: Crinò
Author-Email: rosario.crino@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Author-Name: Giovanni Immordino
Author-X-Name-First: Giovanni 
Author-X-Name-Last: Immordino

Author-Name: Salvatore Piccolo
Author-X-Name-First: Salvatore 
Author-X-Name-Last: Piccolo




Title: Fighting Mobile Crime.


Abstract: We develop a model in which two countries choose their enforcement levels non-
cooperatively, in order to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime
in their territory. We assume that crime is mobile, both ex ante (migration) and ex
post (‡eeing), and that criminals who hide abroad after having committed a crime
in a country must be extradited back. We show that, when extradition is not too
costly, countries overinvest in enforcement compared to the cooperative outcome:
insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. By
contrast, when extradition is sufficiently costly, a large enforcement may induce
criminals to ‡ee the country in which they have perpetrated a crime. Surprisingly,
the fear of extraditing criminals enables countries to coordinate on the efficient
(cooperative) outcome.
Length: 26
Creation-Date: 2018-06
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def071.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2018
Number: def071
Classification-JEL: K14, K42. 
Keywords: Crime, Enforcement, Extradition, Fleeing, Migration.
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def071