Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Astrid Gamba
Author-X-Name-First: Astrid
Author-X-Name-Last: Gamba
Author-Name: Giovanni Immordino
Author-X-Name-First: Giovanni 
Author-X-Name-Last: Immordino
Author-Name: Salvatore Piccolo
Author-X-Name-First: Salvatore
Author-X-Name-Last: Piccolo
Author-Email: salvatore.piccolo@unicatt.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore




Title: Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

Abstract: When Legislators introduce laws that award amnesties to `low-rank' criminals co-
operating with the justice, top criminals may bribe public officials to subvert the law.
Legislators should anticipate this reaction and fight it back by introducing policies that
bundle amnesties for low-rank criminals with amnesties to corrupt officials who plea
guilty. In fact, the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals
to rely on corruption (to avoid sanctions). However, a suitable amnesty for corrupt
officials may increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminal but also for low-rank
ones. This domino effect can deter crime more than a policy based only on amnesties
to low-rank criminals would: a bright side of subversion of law.
Length: 38
Creation-Date: 2016-05
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def039.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2016
Number: def039
Classification-JEL: K14, K42, D73, D78. 
Keywords: Criminal Organizations, Corruption, Leniency.
Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie1:def039