Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Guido Merzoni
Author-Email: guido.merzoni@unicatt.it
Title: Observable and Renegotiable Contracts as Commitments to Cooperate
Abstract: We study an example of strategic delegation in Cournot duopoly and show that if contracts are both observable and renegotiable before becoming common knowledge at the outset of the delegated game, the strategic value of contracts is preserved, but the set of equilibria is greatly enlarged. Managerial contracts can be used by owners to co-ordinate on any product market equilibrium allowing them to get a level of profit at least as large as the profit obtainable in the strategic delegation equilibrium without renegotiation, which is used as a threat point. The equilibrium set includes joint profit maximisation.
Keywords: Delegation; Observability; Renegotiation; Collusion
Classification-JEL: L2; D21; C72
Creation-Date: 2008
File-URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia_internazionale_istituzioni_sviluppo_0801.pdf
File-Format: Application/PDF
Number: dis0801
Handle: RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis0801